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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Basil Ketcham0 appeals his sentence.  Ketcham argues 
that the district court erred when it failed to group the four 
counts of his conviction pursuant to United States Sentencing 
Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") § 3D1.2.0  While we agree with the 
district court that grouping is inappropriate in this case, we 
conclude that the challenged sentence cannot stand because the 
court's decision with respect to grouping was inconsistent with 
another portion of its calculation of the appropriate guideline 
range.  We will, accordingly, reverse the judgment and remand for 
resentencing.0 
 
I. 
                                                           
0
  The indictment, the presentence report, and the district 
court's judgment incorrectly spell the defendant's name 
"Ketchum." 
0
  Because Ketcham was sentenced in December 1994, we apply the 
1994 version of the Guidelines.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4); U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.11(a). 
0
  Ketcham also argues that: (1) the district court erred when it 
ordered an upward adjustment in his criminal history category 
from level I to level II pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3; (2) the 
district court erred when it failed to order a downward 
adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 for minor or minimal 
participation in the offenses; (3) the government breached its 
plea agreement; and (4) the sentencing judge was biased.  We find 
these arguments to be without merit.  
 Ketcham pleaded guilty to transporting child 
pornography in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C.  
§ 2252(a)(1) (count 3); receiving, distributing, and reproducing 
child pornography that had been shipped in interstate commerce in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (counts 4 and 5); and 
possessing child pornography that had been shipped in interstate 
commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (count 6).  
Ketcham did not plead guilty to, and denies, any involvement with 
the production of child pornography.   
 The plea agreement stipulated that: (1) the applicable 
guideline for counts 3, 4, and 5 is U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2;0 (2) the 2 
                                                           
0
  U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 provides in full: 
 
Trafficking in Material Involving the Sexual 
Exploitation of a Minor; Receiving, Transporting, 
Shipping, or Advertising Material Involving the Sexual 
Exploitation of a Minor; Possessing Material Involving 
the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor with Intent to 
Traffic 
 
(a)  Base Offense Level:  15 
 
 (b)  Specific Offense Characteristics 
 
(1) If the material involved a prepubescent minor 
or a minor under the age of twelve years, increase 
by 2 levels. 
 
(2) If the offense involved distribution, increase 
by the number of levels from the table in §2F1.1 
corresponding to the retail value of the material, 
but in no event by less than 5 levels. 
 
(3) If the offense involved material that portrays 
sadistic or masochistic conduct or other 
depictions of violence, increase by 4 levels. 
 
(4) If the defendant engaged in a pattern of 
activity involving the sexual abuse or 
exploitation of a minor, increase by 5 levels. 
level enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1) is appropriate; (3) 
Ketcham engaged "in a pattern of activity involving the sexual 
exploitation of minors for purposes of the 5 level enhancement in 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4);" (4) the applicable guideline for count 6 
is U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4;0 (5) the 2 level enhancements in U.S.S.G.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
(c)  Cross Reference 
 
(1) If the offense involved causing, transporting, 
permitting, or offering or seeking by notice or 
advertisement, a minor to engage in sexually 
explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a 
visual depiction of such conduct, apply §2G2.1 
(Sexually Exploiting a Minor by Production of 
Sexually Explicit Visual or Printed Material; 
Custodian Permitting Minor to Engage in Sexually 
Explicit Conduct; Advertisement for Minors to 
Engage in Production) if the resulting offense 
level is greater than that determined above. 
0
  U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4 provides in its entirety: 
 
Possession of Materials Depicting a Minor Engaged in 
Sexually Explicit Conduct 
 
(a)  Base Offense Level:  13 
 
(b)  Specific Offense Characteristics 
 
(1)  If the material involved a prepubescent minor 
or a minor under the age of twelve years, increase 
by 2 levels. 
 
(2)  If the offense involved possessing ten or 
more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video 
tapes, or other items, containing a visual 
depiction involving the sexual exploitation of a 
minor, increase by 2 levels. 
 
(c)  Cross References 
 
(1)  If the offense involved causing, 
transporting, permitting, or offering or seeking 
by notice or advertisement, a minor to engage in 
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of 
producing a visual depiction of such conduct, 
§ 2G2.4(b)(1) & 2G2.4(b)(2) are appropriate; and (6) the cross 
reference in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c)(1), relating to offenses 
involving the production of child pornography, is not applicable. 
 First, the district court accepted the stipulations 
that the appropriate guideline for counts 3, 4, and 5 is U.S.S.G. 
§ 2G2.2 and that there should be a 2 level increase under 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1) because of the age of the children 
depicted in the pornographic materials.  Second, the district 
court accepted the agreement of the parties that Ketcham's 
offense did not involve the production of child pornography. 
Third, contrary to the plea agreement, the district court 
concluded that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 is the appropriate guideline for 
count 6 via the cross reference in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4(c)(2). 
Finally, the district court did not rely upon the stipulation to 
the 5 level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4).  Rather, it 
conducted an independent analysis and independently concluded 
that the enhancement was appropriate because the possession, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
apply §2G2.1 (Sexually Exploiting a Minor by 
Production of Sexually Explicit Visual or Printed 
Material; Custodian Permitting Minor to Engage in 
Sexually Explicit Conduct; Advertisement for 
Minors to Engage in Production). 
 
(2)  If the offense involved trafficking in 
material involving the sexual exploitation of a 
minor (including receiving, transporting, 
shipping, advertising, or possessing material 
involving the sexual exploitation of a minor with 
intent to traffic), apply §2G2.2 (Trafficking in 
Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a 
Minor; Receiving, Transporting, Shipping, or 
Advertising Material Involving the Sexual 
Exploitation of a Minor; Possessing Material 
Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor with 
Intent to Traffic). 
transportation, reproduction, and distribution alleged in counts 
3, 4, 5, and 6 constituted "a pattern of activity involving the 
sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor" within the meaning of 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4).0 
        The district court calculated the total offense level 
in the following manner.  Each count had a base offense level of 
15 under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2.  The increases provided for in 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1) & (b)(4) raised the offense level of each 
count to 22.  Since the court deemed grouping under U.S.S.G.  
§ 3D1.2 inappropriate,0 each count generated 1 unit under 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4.0  Four units resulted in a 4 level increase. 
Adding 4 to the highest adjusted offense level of 22 resulted in 
                                                           
0
  A sentencing court is not bound by factual stipulations in a 
plea agreement and has discretion to make factual findings based 
on other relevant information.  U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d).  Moreover, 
the plea agreement in this case provided that it did "not bind 
the sentencing court, which may make independent factual findings 
and may reject any or all of the stipulations entered into by the 
parties." 
0
  The relevant portion of U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 is quoted in the text 
infra at page 7. 
0
  U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 provides in relevant part: 
 
Determining the Combined Offense Level 
 
The combined offense level is determined by 
taking the offense level applicable to the 
Group with the highest offense level and 
increasing that offense level by the amount 
indicated in the following table: 
 
 Number of Units Increase in Offense Level 
 
  1   none 
  1-1/2   add 1 level 
  2   add 2 levels 
  2-1/2 - 3   add 3 levels 
  3-1/2 - 5   add 4 levels 
  More than 5  add 5 levels 
a combined adjusted offense level of 26.  Finally, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Ketcham was entitled to a 3 level decrease for 
acceptance of responsibility, producing a total offense level of 
23. 
 
II. 
 Section 3D1.2 of the Guidelines provides in relevant 
part: 
All counts involving substantially the same 
harm shall be grouped together into a single 
Group.  Counts involve substantially the same 
harm within the meaning of this rule: 
. . . 
(b) When counts involve the same victim and 
two or more acts or transactions connected by 
a common criminal objective or constituting 
part of a common scheme or plan. 
(c) When one of the counts embodies conduct 
that is treated as a specific offense 
characteristic in, or other adjustment to, 
the guideline applicable to another of the 
counts. 
(d)  . . . [I]f the offense behavior is 
ongoing or continuous in nature and the 
offense guideline is written to cover such 
behavior. 
We review de novo the district court's interpretation of U.S.S.G. 
§ 3D1.2.  United States v. Bush, 56 F.3d 536, 537-38 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
A. 
 Section 3D1.2(b) of the Guidelines requires the 
grouping of counts that involve the same victim.  The district 
court concluded that grouping Ketcham's offenses pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b) is inappropriate because each count involved 
different victims.  We agree. 
 The four counts of conviction resulted from Ketcham's 
possession, receipt, transportation, distribution, and 
reproduction of photographs and films pornographically depicting 
children.  The pictures and films in each count depicted 
different children.  Accordingly, Ketcham concedes that if the 
children depicted are the victims of his offenses, then grouping 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b) is inappropriate. 
 Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 explains that: 
 
[t]he term "victim" is not intended to 
include indirect or secondary victims. 
Generally, there will be one person who is 
directly and most seriously affected by the 
offense and is therefore identifiable as the 
victim.  For offenses in which there are no 
identifiable victims (e.g., drug or 
immigration offenses, where society at large 
is the victim), the "victim" for purposes of 
subsection[] (b) is the societal interest 
that is harmed. . . .  Ambiguities should be 
resolved in accordance with the purpose of 
this section as stated in the lead paragraph, 
i.e., to identify and group "counts involving 
substantially the same harm." 
Thus our task is to determine the primary victim that Congress 
had in mind when it enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1), (a)(2), and 
(a)(4)(B).  Only if we can find no identifiable victim will we 
deem the primary victim to be society. 
 Our review of the legislative history leads us to 
conclude that the primary victims that Congress had in mind when 
it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) were the children depicted in 
pornographic materials.0  The bill grew out of "a deep and 
abiding concern for the health and welfare of the children and 
youth of the United States."  S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong.,  
2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 41.  The Act 
itself was called the Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act of 1977 ("the Act"). 
 The Senate Report focuses on preventing the harms 
suffered by children depicted in pornographic films and pictures. 
See S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-11, reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 45-48 (referring to "exploited children," "child 
victims," and "boy victims").  The report concluded that "the use 
of children as . . . the subjects of pornographic materials is 
very harmful to both the children and the society as a whole." 
Id. at 43.  While this conclusion refers to the harm to society 
in addition to the harm to the children depicted, it is clear 
from the report as a whole that the primary concern of Congress 
was protecting children from pornography.  This is not a statute 
where there is no identifiable victim.  The fact that a criminal 
statute in a general sense protects society as a whole cannot 
suffice to make society the primary victim.  Were this the case, 
society would be the primary victim of nearly every criminal 
statute. 
 Ketcham acknowledges that the victims of § 2251, which 
makes it a crime to produce pornographic material featuring 
                                                           
0
  The Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in United 
States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1992).  We are not 
persuaded by the Fourth Circuit's contrary conclusion in United 
States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1990). 
children, are the children depicted.  According to Ketcham, 
however, the same cannot be said for § 2252 which makes it 
illegal to transport, distribute or possess such materials.  We 
disagree.  The victims Congress was seeking to protect with all 
of the criminal offenses found in the Act are the same.  Section 
2252, by proscribing the subsequent transportation, distribution, 
and possession of child pornography discourages its production by 
depriving would-be producers of a market.  The primary objective 
of both § 2251 and § 2252 is thus the same -- to protect children 
from exploitation by producers of child pornography -- and the 
victims of both sections are, accordingly, the same. 
 Since the primary victims of offenses under 18 U.S.C.  
§§ 2252(a)(1), (a)(2), & (a)(4)(B) are the children depicted in 
the pornographic materials and because Ketcham's four counts of 
conviction involved materials depicting different children, the 
district court correctly concluded that grouping Ketcham's 
offenses pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b) is inappropriate. 
 
B. 
 Section 3D1.2(c) of the Guidelines requires grouping 
where "one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a 
specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the 
guideline applicable to another of the counts."   The district 
court concluded that grouping Ketcham's offenses under U.S.S.G.  
§ 3D1.2(c) is inappropriate.  We find this conclusion 
inconsistent with the district court's interpretation and 
application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4). 
  Section 2G2.2(b)(4) of the Guidelines provides that 
"[i]f the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving 
the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor, increase by 5 
levels."  The district court determined that the possession, 
transportation, reproduction, and distribution alleged in counts 
3, 4, 5, and 6 constituted "a pattern of activity involving the 
sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor" within the meaning of 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4).  Were this true, each count would embody 
conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic in 
the guideline applicable to each of the other counts.  This would 
require grouping under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c). 
 However, the district court incorrectly interpreted 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4).  The terms "sexual abuse" and 
"exploitation" as those terms are used in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) 
are terms of art.  "Sexual abuse" refers to the conduct covered 
by U.S.S.G. §§ 2A3.1, 2A3.2, 2A3.3, and 2A.3.4.  "Sexual 
exploitation of a minor" refers to conduct covered by U.S.S.G.  
§ 2G2.1.   
 Sections 2A3.1, 2A3.2, 2A3.3, and 2A.3.4 of the 
Guidelines set out the offense levels for the various forms of 
"sexual abuse" proscribed in §§ 2241 ("Aggravated sexual abuse"), 
2242 ("Sexual abuse"), 2243 ("Sexual abuse of a minor or ward") 
and 2244 ("Abusive sexual contact") of Title 18 of the United 
States Code.  These offenses make it criminal for anyone to 
engage in sexual activity with another under stipulated 
circumstances or to cause or permit another to engage in sexual 
activity under stipulated circumstances. 
 Section 2G2.1 of the Guidelines sets out the offense 
level for the various forms of "Sexually Exploiting a Minor" 
proscribed in subsections 2251(a) (employing, inducing, coercing 
or transporting, etc., a minor "with the intent that such minor 
engage in any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of 
producing any visual depiction of such conduct"), § 2251(b) (as a 
parent, guardian or person having custody of a minor, permitting 
the minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose 
of producing a visual depiction), and § 2251(c)(1)(B) (seeking or 
offering by advertisement participation in any act of sexually 
explicit conduct with a minor for the purpose of producing a 
visual depiction) of Title 18 of the United States Code.  These 
offenses make it criminal to engage in stipulated activities in 
connection with the production of materials containing visual 
depictions of sexually explicit conduct involving a minor. 
 Sections 2G2.2 and 2G2.4 of the Guidelines set forth 
the offense level for the various activities with such materials 
after they are produced that are proscribed by subsections 
2251(c)(1)(A) (seeking or offering by advertisement materials for 
sale or exchange that contain visual depictions of sexually 
explicit conduct involving a minor), § 2252(a)(1-3) (transporting 
such depictions in interstate commerce or distributing, 
reproducing, selling or possessing with intent to sell such 
depictions that have been so transported); and § 2252(a)(4) 
(possessing materials containing visual depictions of explicit 
sexual conduct involving a minor) of Title 18 of the United 
States Code.   
 None of these Guidelines refer to the possession, 
transportation, trafficking, receipt, reproduction, or 
distribution of child pornography as "sexual abuse" or 
"exploitation of a minor."  Rather, the Guidelines refer to these 
activities as possessing, transporting, trafficking, receiving, 
or distributing "material involving the sexual exploitation of a 
minor."  U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 (emphasis added).  Thus, a defendant 
who possesses, transports, reproduces, or distributes child 
pornography does not sexually exploit a minor even though the 
materials possessed, transported, reproduced, or distributed 
"involve" such sexual exploitation by the producer.  This 
distinction is important because a defendant who does nothing 
more than deal with child pornography after its production is 
penalized much less severely under the Guidelines than a 
defendant who engages in sexual abuse or exploits minors by 
directly taking part in the production of child pornography. 
 We find support for this distinction in the 
Commission's use of the word "defendant" in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. 
Subsections 2G2.2(b)(1)-(3) of the Guidelines refer to acts 
concerning material involving the sexual exploitation of minors. 
In contrast, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) refers to the defendant's 
involvement in the sexual exploitation of a minor.0  In other 
words, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 as a whole is concerned with acts 
involving sexually exploitive material.  Section 2G2.2(b)(4) of 
the Guidelines singles out for more severe punishment those 
                                                           
0
  U.S.S.G. §§ 2G2.2(b)(1)-(3) and (4) are quoted in footnote 4, 
supra. 
defendants who are more dangerous because they have been involved 
first hand in the exploitation of children.0 
 We also find support for this view in Comment 5 to 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2.  Comment 5 explains: 
If the defendant sexually exploited or abused 
a minor at any time, whether or not such 
sexual abuse occurred during the course of 
the offense, an upward departure may be 
warranted.  In determining the extent of such 
a departure, the court should take into 
consideration the offense levels provided in 
§§ 2A3.1, 2A3.2, and 2A3.4 most commensurate 
with the defendant's conduct, as well as 
whether the defendant has received an 
enhancement under subsection (b)(4) on 
account of such conduct. 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2.  This comment assumes that "the offense" 
covered by U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 can occur without the defendant 
having sexually abused or exploited a minor.  Accordingly, cases 
covered by U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 in which the defendant has sexually 
abused or exploited a minor may warrant an upward departure.  It 
necessarily follows that the conduct covered by § 2G2.2 does not 
itself constitute sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.0 
 Similarly, the Commission distinguished between 
trafficking offenses and sexual exploitation when it added 
                                                           
0
  The "Cross Reference" in § 2G2.2(c) performs a similar 
function. 
0
  We are cognizant of the fact that the title of the subpart of 
the Guidelines in which both §§ 2G2.1 and 2G2.2 are found is 
"Sexual Exploitation of a Minor."  In this context, we believe 
the phrase "sexual exploitation" is used as a shorthand to refer 
to the Guidelines sections concerning the actual sexual 
exploitation of minors as well as Guidelines sections concerning 
material that involves the sexual exploitation of minors.  As we 
have explained, the statutes and the text of the Guidelines can 
only be read to distinguish between sexual abuse of children and 
sexual exploitation from activities with "materials involving" 
such abuse or exploitation. 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4 to the Guidelines in Amendment 372.  The 
Commission explained: 
 This amendment inserts an additional 
guideline at § 2G2.4 to address offenses 
involving receipt or possession of materials 
depicting a minor engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct, as distinguished from 
offenses involving trafficking in such 
material, which continue to be covered under 
§ 2G2.2.  Offenses involving receipt or 
transportation of such material for the 
purpose of trafficking are referenced to  
§ 2G2.2 on the basis of the underlying 
conduct (subsection (c)(2)).  Similarly, 
offenses in which the underlying conduct is 
more appropriately addressed as sexual 
exploitation of a minor are referenced to 
that guideline (subsection (c)(1)). 
U.S.S.G. App. C., Amendment 372 (emphasis added). 
 Lastly, we note that our interpretation of U.S.S.G.  
§ 2G2.2(b)(4) is fully consistent with the reading of that 
guideline by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United 
States v. Chapman, 60 F.3d 894, 896-900 (1st Cir. 1995). 
Given our interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) and the 
government's stipulation that the Ketcham's offense conduct did 
not involve the production of child pornography so as to render 
applicable the cross reference in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c), there 
appears to be no basis for a U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) enhancement. 
Accordingly, on remand the district court should resentence 
Ketcham without the five level U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) increase. 
Since there will no longer be a U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) 
enhancement based on the conduct embodied in other counts, 
grouping pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c) will be inappropriate. 
 
C. 
 We turn finally to the third conclusion reached by the 
district court with respect to grouping under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. 
The district court concluded that grouping Ketcham's offenses is 
inappropriate under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d).  We agree, though for a 
somewhat different reason than the one advanced by the district 
court. 
  In order for grouping to be appropriate under the 
"ongoing or continuous" clause of U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), the 
offense behavior must be ongoing or continuous and the offense 
guideline must be "written to cover" the ongoing or continuous 
offense behavior.  It is intended to require grouping where the 
offense conduct is ongoing or continuous and the offense level 
provided by the applicable offense guideline already takes into 
account the fact that there has been a course of harmful conduct. 
See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A); U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3(b)(1)(A). 
 Even assuming arguendo that Ketcham's conduct was 
ongoing or continuous, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 would not take into 
account the ongoing nature of Ketcham's conduct.  Subsection 
(b)(4) of § 2G2.2, the only portion of that guideline arguably 
directed to ongoing or continuous conduct, as we have seen, is 
not written to cover Ketcham's conduct, ongoing or otherwise. 
  
III. 
 We will reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.   
